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Hybrid Dynamic Pricing Model for Transport PPP 1 
Projects during the Residual Concession Period  2 
 3 
Yajing Zhang1, Jingfeng Yuan2, Jianfeng Zhao3, Li Cheng4, Qiming Li5 4 
 5 
Abstract: Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs) have been adopted worldwide to deliver infrastructure 6 
projects and/ or provide public services. Having a reasonable concession price (operation and transfer) 7 
in place is pivotal for sustaining a win-win relationship between governments and private sectors. 8 
However, historical data have shown that the concession price of PPPs when transfer is less than 9 
satisfactory due to the changing attribute of pricing parameters, causing substantial loss of residual 10 
value (RV). Nevertheless, a rational and systematic pricing model for PPPs, especially transport PPPs 11 
is yet available. To this end, a hybrid dynamic pricing model for transport PPPs during the residual 12 
concession period underpinned by the Case-based Reasoning technique is proposed. Furthermore, 13 
using a case study of Western Harbor Crossing tunnel in Hong Kong, the proposed model is validated 14 
to be able to account for the dynamic pricing parameters and calculate a reasonable and accurate 15 
residual concession price. The contributions of this study are twofold: (1) it highlights that a 16 
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reasonable concession price beyond the operation period is significant in maintaining RV; (2) it 17 
provides a hybrid dynamic pricing model for governments and private sectors to calibrate the current 18 
less-than-satisfactory residual concession price.  19 
Keywords: Case-based Reasoning; PPPs; Residual concession price; Residual value; Transport 20 
infrastructure. 21 
Introduction 22 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been adopted worldwide to deliver infrastructure and/ or 23 
provide public services (Cheng et al. 2016; De Los Ríos-Carmenado et al. 2016). In a typical PPP 24 
project, the private sector is authorized to finance, design, build and operate the project, and transfer 25 
the asset to the host government after the concession period expires. Such an arrangement is expected 26 
to ease governments’ fiscal constraints and provide quality services (Kwak et al. 2009; Bulsara et al. 27 
2015; Ameyaw et al. 2015). However, the asset early terminated/ transferred usually cannot meet the 28 
output specifications set in the concession agreement, imposing adverse impacts on governments’ 29 
subsequent management and thus triggering the loss of residual value (RV) (Yuan et al. 2018). For 30 
example, the Nanjing Yangtze River Tunnel was returned to the local government due to the standoff 31 
in the toll level negotiation. The consequence of this early transfer is the huge loss of RV for both 32 
contractual parties (Yuan et al. 2016). With lots of PPPs being at or about to enter the transfer stage 33 
(Tassopoulos et al. 2014), their RV continues to suffer and will remain so unless obstacles in the 34 
pricing mechanism are tackled. 35 
Although RV can be affected by a number of variables (Burke and Demirag 2015; Yuan et al. 36 
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2015), Yuan et al. (2015) has identified that profitability is a critical factor that influences RV. In 37 
addition, profitability is determined by the concession price of PPPs, which indicates that a reasonable 38 
concession price has a positive impact on RV (Shen et al. 2007; Xu et al. 2012). This is supported by 39 
the fact that governments and private investors tend to negotiate a price that can secure a rational 40 
return and guarantee the successful implementation of PPPs concurrently. As such, considerable 41 
studies have been conducted on pricing mechanism (Liu et al. 2017; Hassan et al. 2013), pricing 42 
methods (e.g. game theory, cloud computing data) (Bonnafous 2010; Bai and Li 2017), and price 43 
adjustment mechanism (Chen 2013; Liu et al. 2017). For instance, Xu et al. (2012) proposed a model 44 
to determine the concession price for PPP highway projects using system dynamics. Moving ahead, 45 
Wang et al. (2018) considered the impact of not only price but demands and the concession period on 46 
shaping an optimal build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract under government subsidies. Nevertheless, 47 
most of these studies focus on product pricing in the concession period and therefore have a tendency 48 
to be static. Contrastingly, the pricing of PPPs is a rather complicated and risky process containing 49 
various influencing parameters (Chen and Nozick 2016). Owing to their changing attributes, the price 50 
when asset is transferred to the government is usually undesirable (i.e. too high or too low). However, 51 
few studies have been undertaken to investigate PPP concession pricing from the perspective of these 52 
dynamic parameters, especially during the residual concession period.  53 
To fill this gap, this study aims to address the following research question: “How can a dynamic 54 
concession price be determined in transport PPPs during the residual concession period?” 55 
Acknowledging that the varying trend of these parameters affecting the concession price can be 56 
depicted through similar projects, Case-based Reasoning (CBR) approach is used to acquire 57 
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knowledge on residual concession price determination (Bu et al. 2018; Yuan et al. 2018). Specifically, 58 
determination of concession price during the residual concession period comprises: (1) constructing 59 
the concession pricing model at the end of the concession period through Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA); 60 
(2) applying CBR to accommodate the changing trend of price parameters and proposing a hybrid 61 
dynamic residual concession model; (3) testing the developed model using a real-world transport PPP 62 
project.  63 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. It begins by providing a comprehensive 64 
overview and analysis of literature focusing on pricing of PPPs and CBR. The research approach then 65 
introduces the overall research framework. In the following section, the hybrid dynamic model 66 
including model formation and model adjustment is detailed. The case study section verifies the 67 
proposed model using the Hong Kong West Harbor Crossing (WHC) tunnel project. This paper 68 
finishes with a concluding remark on its contributions. 69 
Literature Review 70 
Pricing of PPP Projects 71 
According to World Bank (2017), there is not a universally accepted definition of PPPs and their 72 
contract types vary. Nevertheless, some common characteristics have materialized over their decades 73 
of development, including large-scale investment (e.g. millions of dollars), long-term contracts (e.g. 74 
30 years or more) and multiple project stakeholders (e.g. the government, the private sector and the 75 
general public) (Wang et al. 2018). Similarly, risks are undoubtedly embedded within the life cycle of 76 
PPPs, such as financing risk, poor public decision-making process, completion risk, and inability of 77 
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concessionaires (Iyer and Sagheer 2010; Carbonara et al. 2015; Burke and Demirag 2017). Inadequate 78 
management of these risks could result in unsatisfactory performance or even project failure. In order 79 
to mitigate these risks and ensure project success, many studies have been conducted on risk-oriented 80 
decision methods (Grimsey and Lewis 2002; Ke et al. 2010), procurement methods (Lam and Chow 81 
1999; Kumaraswamy and Morris 2002), concession-related issues (Shen and Wu 2005; Ng et al. 82 
2007), economic problems (Chang and Chen 2001; Xenidis and Angelides 2005), and success factors 83 
for PPP projects (Li et al. 2005; Zhang 2005). Of note, concession related issues have formed a 84 
significant research field, in which concession period and concession price play a major role (Cui et al. 85 
2008).  86 
PPP product pricing is a complicated and rather risky decision-making process and has to 87 
maintain a balance between different stakeholders (e.g. the private sector, the public sector and the 88 
general public) (Bai and Li 2017). In order to win the bid, it is necessary for private investors to cast a 89 
low concession price. As they are profit-driving, they also prefer a high concession price to guarantee 90 
the rate of return. In comparison, governments aim for a concession price that does not exceed the 91 
budget and can sustain the operation of PPPs. The general public concerns about whether the 92 
adjustment of prices is affordable on the premise that the same level of service is provided. Inherent 93 
variances of stakeholders’ interests are not the scope of this paper, but the uncertainty they bring to the 94 
pricing of PPPs should be noted. In line with the uncertainties (e.g. financial risk and revenue risks), 95 
they render the pricing of PPPs to be dynamic in nature. In other words, if they are not treated in the 96 
process, the concession price when transferred back to the government will be either too high or too 97 
low, causing enormous loss of the RV (Li et al. 2005). By and large, such uncertain issues as market 98 
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risks and project risks have been overlooked in the current methods (see next section), jeopardizing 99 
their ability in dynamic adjustment of concession price.  100 
Pricing of Transport PPPs 101 
Infrastructure pricing is an important topic in PPPs as it determines the commercial variability and 102 
profitability of a project (Tassopoulos and Theodoropoulos 2014; Kweun et al. 2018). A rational price 103 
during the residual concession period, therefore, can contribute to the accumulation of RV by 104 
satisfying both contractual parties (Tassopoulos and Theodoropoulos 2014). Accordingly, there is an 105 
abundance of literature that has studied infrastructure pricing, particularly in the field of transport (see 106 
for example, Shen et al. 2007; Bonnafous 2010; Xu et al. 2012; Chen 2013; Hassan et al. 2013; Liu et 107 
al. 2017; Bai and Li 2017). Among them, marginal cost pricing mostly applies to government-funded 108 
projects while the capital asset pricing model (Yuan et al. 2018), game theory model (Dai and Song 109 
2010), a system dynamics pricing model of PPP expressway projects (Liu et al. 2017), and 110 
multi-objective planning (Burke and Demirag 2015) focus on PPP projects. Despite the different 111 
applications, these models unanimously place emphases on the pricing mechanism and pricing 112 
adjustment of transport projects (Claire et al. 2019). However, the existing models pervade in the 113 
concession period without a consideration of ‘what the price will look like’ during the residual 114 
concession period, which determines RV after transfer. For instance, although Bonnafous (2010) 115 
considered the impact of unexpected changes on projects’ price, it neglects pricing parameters during 116 
the residual concession period. 117 
What is more, in spite of the identification of various uncertain factors that affect transport PPPs 118 
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(Yu, 2006), they have rarely been integrated into pricing models, particularly during the residual 119 
concession period. For example, Xu et al. (2012) argue that the quantifiable operation cost should be 120 
taken into account when calculating transport PPPs’ toll. In another case, government support should 121 
be captured as transport PPPs’ toll can be lowered because of the government subsidy. The 122 
unaccountability of both qualitative and quantitative parameters in current models disabled their 123 
ability in the dynamic adjustment of concession price. Put simply, they tend to be static by nature. 124 
Therefore, it is imperative to have a dynamic pricing model in place to embrace large numbers of 125 
PPPs that are entering the residual concession period.  126 
Case-based Reasoning (CBR) 127 
It has been acknowledged that CBR can solve the problems of the target (new) case with similar 128 
situations of previous cases (Aamodt and Plaza 1994). Specifically, the core of CBR is remembering 129 
past situations and reusing their solutions to the new case through four procedures: (1) Retrieve; (2) 130 
Reuse; (3) Revise; and (4) Retain (Aamodt and Plaza 1994). Retrieve is a search process in which the 131 
most relevant cases are located in the case database by calculating the local similarity and global 132 
similarity between the selected case and the target case. Then, the solution of the similar cases is 133 
initially applied to the new case scenario at the Reuse stage. Furthermore, Revise process adjusts the 134 
past solutions to fit the new situation. In Retain process, the derived solution of the new problem is 135 
stored as a new case (Cho et al. 2017).  136 
As one of the emerging paradigms for designing intelligent systems, CBR is robust in improving 137 
the effectiveness of complex and unstructured decision-making. Essentially, CBR has been widely 138 
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implemented to address decision-making issues regarding finance (Lei et al. 2001; Seo et al. 2007), 139 
medical diagnosis (Li and Yeh 2004), and knowledge management (Ahn et al. 2007) to name a few. 140 
Noteworthy, CBR is the most common method used to develop decision support systems in the field 141 
of construction engineering (Lee et al. 2019). Many applications have been found in risk management, 142 
knowledge management, building maintenance, and green building simulation with forecasting and 143 
monitoring being the primary focus (Cheng et al. 2009). For instance, Wang et al. (2003) build a 144 
technology integration knowledge repository using the CBR approach. The CBR system can not only 145 
reflect an objective condition of past PPP projects with stored historical data but can also provide an 146 
objective method for retrieving similar experience with the similarity algorithms (Lee et al. 2019). 147 
Moreover, data stored in CBR system can be revised and updated, ensuring a comprehensive and live 148 
case database. Thus, all-sides of experiences are available for solving problems of the new case. More 149 
importantly, attributing to the embedded artificial intelligence, CBR approach is more efficient and 150 
effective than manpower (Yuan et al. 2018). As a consequence, decision makers, such as governments 151 
and PPP project operators, can obtain desired advice and experience (e.g. changing trends of uncertain 152 
parameters) through CBR’s user-friendly interface.  153 
Pricing of PPPs, a forecasting and monitoring process, is undertaken mostly using methods 154 
identified above, which are arguably compatible with PPPs’ pricing as they are rule-based (Liu et al. 155 
2017). It means that these pricing mechanisms exist without scientific rules due to the lack of 156 
theoretical foundations and changing parameters. In contrast, CBR is based upon shallow knowledge 157 
and does not require significant efforts in knowledge engineering (Bu et al. 2018). This creates an 158 
ideal environment for the adoption of CBR in PPPs’ pricing as it relieves the burden of lengthy 159 
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analysis of the problem domain and improve efficiency and quality of PPPs’ pricing (Feng et al. 2006). 160 
Nevertheless, there is a lack of studies efficiently applying CBR to the pricing of transport PPPs and 161 
proposing a novel residual pricing model that accommodates their changing features during the 162 
residual concession period. Relying on an accessible database of historical PPP projects, this study 163 
represents one of the first in using CBR to dynamically address PPPs’ concession price during the 164 
residual concession period. 165 
Research Approach 166 
A hybrid approach combining CBA and CBR is adopted to address the dynamic pricing parameters in 167 
transport PPPs. CBA is the most common pricing method used in the project feasibility analysis to 168 
offer an initial price (Thomas and Chindarkar 2019). Given the changing attribute of pricing 169 
parameters, CBR, as above mentioned is well suited to develop a hybrid pricing model during the 170 
residual concession period drawing on experience of past similar cases (Aamodt and Plaza 1994). 171 
Without considering the rich experience and information obtained from past cases, the changing trend 172 
of pricing parameters remains ambiguous. Therefore, CBR enables a comprehensive understanding of 173 
‘what will look like’ in the target project based on what has transpired in the past (Weick et al. 2005). 174 
By doing so, this research contributes to the body of knowledge by proposing a hybrid dynamic 175 
pricing model for transport PPPs during the residual concession period. The research framework is 176 




Figure 1. Research framework 179 
 180 
• Phase I, theoretical pricing model (Pi-1). First, parameters affecting the residual concession 181 
price are identified to construct the theoretical pricing model that is based on CBA. Second, 182 
in order to overcome the deficiencies in CBA, an improved pricing model is developed. 183 
• Phase II, CBR based pricing model (Ri). First, a dynamic price adjustment mechanism is 184 
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proposed by considering four categories of uncertainties (i.e. changing risk factors), which 185 
incorporate: (1) government behavior; (2) public attitude; (3) market risk; and (4) project 186 
risk. Second, CBR is employed to provide data input for the price adjustment mechanism 187 
and the theoretical pricing model. Specifically, the most similar case is retrieved from the 188 
case database through calculating their local similarity and global similarity. In order to 189 
calculate the global similarity, the weight of attribute i can be acquired using the expert 190 
evaluation method through a questionnaire survey, which has proven to be effective in PPP 191 
related research (Xenidis and Angelides 2005). Then, price parameters, including changing 192 
features of the pricing parameters and the price adjustment range (i.e. r) are predicted using 193 
the most similar case.  194 
• Phase III, hybrid dynamic residual pricing model (Pi). First, the residual concession period 195 
and the periodicity of the concession price are calculated. Second, the final hybrid model is 196 
proposed according to the equation Pi= Pi-1(1+Ri).  197 
• Phase IV, case study. The WHC tunnel in Hong Kong is selected as the target case to test the 198 
model proposed in Phase III. In the case, the Eastern Harbor Tunnel (EHT) is identified as 199 
the most similar case from a case database containing 41 past transport projects, based on 200 
which values of the changing risk factors, such as traffic volume (𝑄𝑡), exchange rate (e), 201 
inflation rate (𝐼𝑁𝐹2), operation cost (𝐶𝑡), other revenue (𝑌𝑡), price adjustment range (r) and 202 
price adjustment period (n) are predicted by employing CBR. The result is then discussed.  203 
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Hybrid Dynamic Pricing Model 204 
Theoretical Pricing Model 205 
CBA-based pricing model for transport PPPs 206 
The concession price of transport PPPs is usually negotiated and confirmed after the project feasibility 207 
study, in which an initial price is proposed using a CBA. A CBA begins with compiling a 208 
comprehensive list of all the costs and benefits associated with the project or decision, namely cash 209 
outflow parameters and cash inflow parameters (Tassopoulos and Theodoropoulos 2014). 210 
Subsequently, the CBA result is generated either by subtracting costs from benefits (Eq. (1)) or by 211 
dividing benefits by costs (Eq. (4)). As the concession price forms part of the cash inflow parameters, 212 
its value (Pt) can be calculated by transforming the equations. 213 
The cash outflow side (i.e. expenditure) consists of cost and tax, in which project cost (i.e. total 214 
construction cost and operation cost) determines the concession price level (Tassopoulos et al. 2014). 215 
The total construction cost comprises material cost, labor cost, equipment cost, price reserve fund, and 216 
construction period loan interest. As private sectors are responsible for constructing the project, it is 217 
obvious that an appropriate concession price will help them reimburse this part of cost (Huang et al., 218 
2004). Therefore, the total construction cost has a close relationship with the PPP project cost and 219 
concession pricing. The operation cost refers to the daily expenses incurred in running a PPP project, 220 
such as sales and administration fees. Transport PPPs feature a long-term operation up to 50 years and 221 
require corresponding maintenance funds, the amount of which is largely related to the operation 222 
entity’s management standard, technology standard, and personnel competency (Li and Yeh 2004). By 223 
contrast, the cash inflow side (i.e. revenue) is surrounded with traffic volume, concession period, and 224 
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the concession price (Ng et al. 2007b). The concession period defines the time span in which the 225 
concessionaire has the right to construct, operate, and maintain the project until it is transferred to the 226 
government (Tassopoulos and Theodoropoulos 2014). Concession price is the source of revenue 227 
during transport PPPs’ concession period, which is commensurate with market conditions and 228 
government policies. An accurate forecast and determination of the concession price at the transfer 229 
stage based on reliable data and inference processes can assist stakeholders in accumulating RV. 230 
Having considered the pricing parameters in both sides, the result of the aggregate costs and 231 
benefits should be compared quantitatively to determine if the benefits outweigh the costs. Thus, 232 
based on the cash outflow and inflow parameters, the theoretical transport PPPs’ concession price is 233 
formulated in Eq. (1). 234 
        𝐵𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 = [(𝑃𝑡 · 𝑄𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡) · (1 − 𝑇1) − 𝐶𝑘𝑡 − 𝑒𝑡 · 𝑅𝑡 · 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐶𝑑] ·（1 − 𝑇2）+𝐶𝑑 − 𝑒𝑡 · A  (1) 235 
       𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃 ·（1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐹）
𝑡
                           (2) 236 
where 𝐵𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 means the net profit in year t, 𝑃𝑡  is the concession price in year t, 𝑄𝑡 is the traffic 237 
volume in year t, 𝑌𝑡 is the other revenue in year t, T1 is the sales tax rate, 𝐶𝑘𝑡 is the operation cost in 238 
year t,  𝑒𝑡 is the exchange rate in year t, 𝑅𝑡 is the interest in year t, 𝐷𝑡 is the loan in year t, 𝐶𝑑 is 239 
the depreciation, T2 is the income tax rate, A is the annual principal repayment, P is the initial price, 240 
and INF is the annual rate of inflation. Notably, the same annotations apply for the following 241 
equations. 242 
In order to facilitate the calculation, it is assumed that (1) during the operation stage, exchange 243 
rate, interest, other revenue and operation cost remain the same, thus 𝑒𝑡=e，𝑅𝑡=R, 𝑌𝑡=Y，𝐶𝑘𝑡=𝐶𝑘, 244 
where e, R, Y and 𝐶 are the initial exchange, interest, other revenue and cost, respectively; (2) project 245 
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loan in year 0 is D and the principal is repaid equally every year during the operation/ concession 246 
period, thus 𝐷𝑡=D-A·t. In addition, depreciation is calculated using the average life method. In this 247 
case, the net profit during the concession year can be represented as: 248 
∑ (𝐵𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡)
𝑇𝑐−𝑇0
𝑡=1 = ∑ {[(𝑃 · 𝑄𝑡（1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐹）
𝑡
+ 𝑌) · (1 − 𝑇1) − 𝐶𝑘 − 𝑒 · 𝑅 ·（𝐷 − 𝐴 · 𝑡）
𝑇𝑐−𝑇0
𝑡=1249 
− 𝐶𝑑] ·（1 − 𝑇2）+ 𝐶𝑑 − 𝑒 · 𝐴}                                                (3) 250 
According to CBA, a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) can be computed to summarize the overall 251 
relationship between the costs and benefits of a proposed project. If the BCR is no less than 1, the 252 
project is economically feasible. Therefore, with the constraint shown in Eq. (4) and input of other 253 









= 1                     (4) 255 
where 𝑇𝑐 is the concession period (i.e. unit: year),  𝑇0 is the construction period (i.e. unit: year), 𝐶0 256 
is the total construction cost and 𝐾𝐸 is the discount rate. 257 
Improved CBA-based pricing model for transport PPPs 258 
Given that the CBA-based pricing model in Eq. (3) is characterized with incomprehensive pricing 259 
parameters, unchanged annual operation cost, single inflation rate and a lack of residual value risks, 260 
following improvements have been made:  261 
• The influence of government behavior, market risk, project risk, and public attitude on the 262 
concession price are explained in the improved model, which will be discussed in the next 263 
section;  264 
• Data at the current research time and after are predicted based on the historical data of 265 
operation period, which reflects a dynamic attribute, such as the different operation cost (𝐶𝑡) 266 
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each year; 267 
• The influence of force majeure, project quality, service quality, depreciation (𝐶𝑑 ) and 268 
operational accident on project pricing are adjusted into the operation cost;  269 
• The single inflation rate is divided into the average inflation rate in the past concession stage 270 
(INF1) and the simulated average inflation rate from current research period to the residual 271 
concession period (INF2). In addition, the sales tax rate (T1) is assumed to be zero due to the 272 
unavailability of the data of sales tax rate. For consistency purpose, foreign currency loans 273 
for project investment have been converted into local currency, which means exchange rate (e) 274 
is set to be 1. 275 
In brief, Ck and Cd in Eq. (3) can both be included in 𝐶𝑡, and T1 is 0 and e is 1. Therefore, Eq. (3) 276 
can be rewritten as Eq. (5). 277 
∑ 𝐵𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡
𝑇𝑐−𝑇0
𝑡=1 = ∑ [𝑃 · 𝑄𝑡（1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐹1）
𝑡
+ 𝑌 − 𝐶𝑡 − 𝐴] ·（1 − 𝑇2）
𝑇−1





+ 𝑌 − 𝐶𝑡−𝐴] · (1 − 𝑇2) − 𝑅(1 − 𝑇2) · ∑ （𝐷 − 𝐴·𝑡）
𝑇F
𝑡=1   (5) 279 
    By integrating Eq. (4) (i.e. ∑ （𝐵𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡）（1 + 𝐾𝐸）
−𝑡𝑇𝑐−𝑇0
𝑡=1 = 𝐶0) into Eq. (5), the improved 280 
CBA-based pricing model is as follows: 281 
(1 − 𝑇2) {∑ [𝑃
𝑇−1













𝑡=1  =𝐶0                               (6) 283 
where 𝑇F is the payment deadline agreed in the contract and T is the current research period.  284 
The improved CBA-based pricing model (i.e. Eq. (6)) is then transformed to Eq. (7) to facilitate 285 
the calculation of the theoretical concession price. 286 
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(1 − 𝑇2) ∑ [𝑃𝑡
𝑇−1
𝑡=1 𝑄𝑡(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐹1) + 𝑌 − 𝐶𝑡 − A]
1
(1+𝐾𝐸)𝑡










𝑡=T = −(1 − 𝑇2) ∑ [
𝑇𝑐
𝑡=T 𝑃𝑡𝑄𝑡(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐹2)]
1
(1+𝐾𝐸)𝑡
   (7)           288 
As it is a polynomial equation with high order, each term of Eq. (7) is analyzed. 289 
Part I: (1 − 𝑇2) ∑ [𝑃𝑡
𝑇−1
𝑡=1 𝑄𝑡(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐹1) + 𝑌 − 𝐶𝑡 − A]
1
(1+𝐾𝐸)𝑡
 refers to the present value of 290 
after-tax profit before the current study year. 291 




𝑡=1  refers to the present value of interest in the payment 292 
deadline. 293 




𝑡=T  refers to the present value of after-tax revenue after 294 
current study year. 295 
Part IV: (1 − 𝑇2)∑ [
𝑇𝑐
𝑡=T 𝑄𝑡(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐹2)]
1
(1+𝐾𝐸)𝑡
 refers to the present value of after-tax traffic 296 
volume after current study year. 297 
Therefore, the theoretical pricing model can be finalized as:  298 
𝑃𝑖−1 = |
the present value of net profits over the concession year
the present value of traffic flow after current year
| = |(𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭 I + 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭 II + 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭 III)/𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭 IV| (8)                   299 
As shown in Eq. (8), the theoretical pricing model can provide the government and the private 300 
sector with an initial concession price. However, as previously mentioned, there are uncertainties (i.e. 301 
both quantifiable and unquantifiable risk factors) dramatically impacting transport projects’ residual 302 
concession price. Thus, a price adjustment mechanism that takes into account the impact of risk 303 
factors should be put in place to yield the “win-win” dynamic pricing model.  304 
CBR-based Pricing Model 305 
Price adjustment mechanism 306 
Due to the long-term construction and operation cycles of PPPs and affiliated risks, the actual 307 
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concession price of transport PPPs usually deviates from the estimated value (i.e. the initial concession 308 
price). For example, inflation can bring currency depreciation and a decrease in the investor's actual 309 
return. Hence, there is no doubt that the investor will require an increase to the concession price to 310 
compensate for the inflation loss. In order to address these risks and ensure a dynamic concession 311 
price, pertinent risk factors need to be identified. Risks in PPP projects have been studied and 312 
categorized by many researchers (e.g. Chan et al. 2015; Xenidis and Angelides 2005; Chou et al. 313 
2012). In this study, drawing upon the authors' prior studies (Yuan et al. 2018), verified price-related 314 
risk factors in transport PPPs are listed in Table 1.  315 
Table 1. Price-related risk factors in PPP projects 316 










2011; Cho et 
al. 2017;)  
Policy and legislation 
change 
Local government's inconsistent 
application of new laws and regulations, 
such as changes in land management 
law, taxation law, labor law, 




The general public’s reaction to the 
increase of price 
Market risk 
Demand 
An increase in market demand (traffic 
volume) 
Interest rate 
The uncertainty in interest variation 
owing to immature local economic and 
banking systems 
Foreign exchange 
Fluctuation in currency exchange rate 
and/or difficulty in convertibility 
Inflation rate 
The rise in the overall price and the 
decrease in the market value or the 
purchasing power of the currency 
Peer competition 
The bidding competition and possible 
quotations from the rivals 
Construction quality 
The project quality may fail to reach its 
expected standards and result in high 
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Service quality The project quality may fail to reach its 
expected standards and result in high 






Construction cost Cost overrun 
Operation cost Cost overrun 
Schedule delay Construction period 
Concession period Schedule delay 
 317 
Based on the retrieved risk factors that impact the concession price, following price adjustment is 318 
proposed to mitigate the loss of RV after project transfer. 319 
Adjustment coefficient based on government behavior and public attitude 320 
Quasi-public goods, the intermediate between public goods and private goods, are featured with 321 
imperfect competition and externality (Yu 2006). Transport PPPs are such products as their prices are 322 
dominated by both the government and the market (Shen and Wu, 2005). The administrative 323 
intervention usually takes effect when the market fails. For example, if the rising price is supported by 324 
the government or laws and regulations, then the price would rise. Alternatively, the price would 325 
remain unchanged. What is more, it is proved that the general public’s attitude is critical towards the 326 
concession price of PPP projects (Hodge et al. 2017). Specifically, in the case of public protests or 327 
choosing an alternative service due to the rise of concession price, measures would be taken by the 328 
government or the market to adjust the price (Ho et al. 2015). In this sense, the general public plays a 329 
fundamental role in determining the price adjustment. The impact of these risks on the concession 330 
price can, therefore, be expressed by a 0-1 function as follows: 331 
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 𝑓1 (𝑥) = {
1,                                         Other situations
0,   Public opposition to increased price
                 (9) 332 
𝑓2 (𝑥) = {
1,                                                  Other situations
0, Government opposition to increased price
             (10) 333 
𝑓3 (𝑥) = {
1,                                                         Other situations
0, Laws and regulations  restraining price rising
           (11) 334 
‘Other situations’ in 𝑓1 (𝑥), 𝑓2 (𝑥), 𝑓3 (𝑥)  can be scenarios whereby: (1) when prices of PPP 335 
projects go up, the reactions of the public, government, and laws and regulations are supportive; (2) 336 
the price remains unchanged; and (3) the price falls. It means that when ‘other situations’ hold, the 337 
value of function representing the effects of these three factors is 1.  338 
Adjustment coefficient based on market risk  339 
The influence of peer competition in market risk on project pricing is reflected in traffic volume. 340 
Thus, quantifiable factors related to market risk, including traffic volume, exchange rate and inflation 341 
rate, are discussed. In order to eliminate the risk of these factors and to enhance the comparability 342 
between cases, the changes of these price influencing factors are expressed with relative value. Taking 343 
‘traffic volume’ as an example, its variation range (the rate of increase or decrease) in the kth year of 344 













× 100%                           (13) 347 
where, m is the number of similar cases; 𝑄𝑘
′  is the traffic volume adjustment range of the target case 348 
Y; 𝑆𝑖𝑚(?̅?, 𝑋𝑖) is the similarity between the selected case 𝑋𝑖  and the target case ?̅?, which will be 349 
discussed in the following section; 𝑄𝑖,𝑘 is the traffic volume adjustment range of the selected case 𝑋𝑖  350 
in the year of k; ?̅?𝑖,𝑘  and ?̅?𝑖,𝑘−1are the traffic volume of the selected case 𝑋𝑖  in the year of k and k-1, 351 
respectively. Of note, the calculation method also applies to exchange rate, inflation rate, and the 352 
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following operation cost and price adjustment period (z). 353 
Adjustment coefficient based on project risk 354 
As mentioned above, the influence of some project risks, including force majeure, project quality and 355 
service quality on project pricing is included in the operation cost. Moreover, the concession price of 356 
PPP projects generally presents a periodic feature (Kumaraswamy and Morris 2002). Accordingly, 357 
PPP project price tends to remain stable for a period (e.g. usually 3-5 years) and be adjusted every z 358 
years afterwards. That is, the price adjustment range r will adjust the price at the beginning of next 359 




                                 (14) 361 
where, ?̅? is the periodicity of concession price, 𝑇𝐶  is the concession period and 𝑇 is the current 362 
research period. 363 
The theoretical price adjustment range of the target case Y is supposed to be same and can be 364 












× 100%                              (16) 367 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑘 is the price adjustment range of the selected case 𝑋𝑖  in the year of k; and r̅𝑖,𝑘 and ?̅?𝑖,𝑘−1 368 
is the price of the selected case 𝑋𝑖  in the year of k and k-1, respectively. 369 
Combining all the risks identified in Table 1 (i.e. Eq. (9) to Eq. (16)), the actual price adjustment 370 
range is calculated as: 371 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝑟𝑓1 (𝑥) 𝑓2 (𝑥)𝑓3 (𝑥)                          (17) 372 
where 𝑅𝑖 is the actual price adjustment range in the period i. 373 
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CBR-based pricing 374 
The CBR-based pricing model consists of: (1) retrieving past similar cases; (2) predicting the value of 375 
pricing parameters required in the theoretical pricing model, such as traffic volume (𝑄𝑡), exchange rate 376 
(e), inflation rate (INF), operation cost (𝐶𝑡), other revenue (𝑌𝑡) in Eq. (8), and the price adjustment 377 
mechanism, such as the periodicity of concession price (n) in Eq. (14) and price adjustment range (r) 378 
in Eq. (15). 379 
Specifically, using CBR, past similar cases (Xi) are retrieved by comparing their local similarity 380 
(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖(𝑎𝑖
?̅?,𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖)) and global similarity (Sim (?̅?, Xi)) with the new case (?̅?). Local similarity (i.e. the 381 
attribute similarity score) measures the similarity between the new case’s attributes and the local cases 382 
in the case database. As shown in Eq. (18), the numerical attribute similarity algorithm is adopted to 383 










𝑋𝑖)) ,   𝑎𝑖
?̅?<𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖








     (18) 385 
  When 𝑎𝑖
?̅? and 𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖 are string attributes, the string attribute similarity algorithm is used to 386 




1      (𝑎𝑖
?̅?=𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖)
0      (𝑎𝑖
?̅?≠𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖)
                 (19) 388 
where, 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖 (𝑎𝑖
?̅?, 𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖) is the similarity between attributes 𝑎𝑖
?̅? and 𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖; 𝑎𝑖
?̅?  is the index of the new 389 
case, and 𝑎𝑖




?̅? is the absolute 390 
distance between 𝑎𝑖
?̅?  and 𝑎𝑖




𝑋𝑖))  is the distance-based 391 
similarity function representing the relationships between the distance 𝑑(𝑎𝑖
?̅? ,𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖) and the similarity 392 
𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖(𝑎𝑖
?̅? ,𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖). This similarity function can be computed by MyCBR (version 2.6.6), which is an 393 
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open-source software developed by School of Computer Science and German Research Centre for 394 
Artificial Intelligence (Competence Centre CBR at DFKI, 2020). The value of 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖(𝑎𝑖
?̅? ,𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖) is 395 
between 0 and 1, where 1 means 𝑎𝑖
?̅? and 𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖 are 100% the same. 396 
Global similarity (i.e. the case similarity score) is then measured by weighing each attribute to 397 
show how certain local cases are similar to the new case. Based on the local similarity above, the 398 
global similarity is calculated in Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) to identify the most similar case in the case 399 
database. 400 
𝑆𝑖𝑚(?̅?, 𝑋𝑖) = ∑ 𝑤𝑖sim𝑖(𝑎𝑖
?̅? ,𝑎𝑖






                                  (21) 402 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑚(?̅?, 𝑋𝑖) is the global similarity between the new case ?̅? and the selected case 𝑋𝑖; 𝑤𝑖 is 403 
the weight of attribute i; n is the number of attributes. 𝑥𝑖𝑗  is the score of indicator i in the No. j 404 
questionnaire; and M is the total score of all indicators.  405 
Following the retrieval process in Eqs. (18)-(21), data required for the theoretical pricing model 406 
(Eq. (8)) and the price adjustment mechanism (Eq. (17)) can be extracted from the most similar case 407 
to formulate the hybrid dynamic pricing model during the residual concession period.  408 
Hybrid Dynamic Pricing model 409 
With the theoretical pricing model and CBR-based pricing model, the hybrid dynamic pricing model is 410 
proposed in Eq. (22). The theoretical pricing model provides a basic pricing structure, while the 411 
CBR-based pricing model includes the price adjustment mechanism, identifies the most similar past 412 
case and provides data input for the theoretical pricing model and the price adjustment mechanism.  413 
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Pi=Pi-1（1+𝑅𝑖）                               (22) 414 
where Pi is the price in the residual concession period i, Pi-1 is the price in period i-1 as shown in Eq. 415 
(8), and Ri is the actual price adjustment range in the period i as shown in Eq. (17). 416 
In this hybrid dynamic pricing model, both the traditional pricing parameters and the changing 417 
pricing parameters during the residual concession period that impact projects’ RV are accommodated. 418 
More importantly, the problem of sophisticated residual concession pricing of PPP projects is 419 
transformed into the determination of the price adjustment coefficient and prediction of price 420 
parameters (Table 2). In doing so, it will not only simplify the settlement of the price adjustment, but 421 
also can greatly improve the speed and quality of the pricing process. 422 
Table 2. Input of the model 423 
Category price adjustment coefficient price parameters 
Input data f1(x), f2(x), f3(x), 𝑄𝑘
′ , r T2, P, Qt, INF1, INF2, Y, Ct, A, KE, R, D, t, C0 
 424 
Case Study 425 
Case Background 426 
The WHC project is selected as a case study to test the feasibility of the proposed hybrid dynamic 427 
pricing model as it is a good example of transport PPPs that are entering into the residual concession 428 
period. The 30-year WHC contract was signed off by Western Harbor Company Limited and former 429 
British Hong Kong Government, with the construction period being five years from 1993 to 1997 and 430 
the operation period being 25 years from 1997 to 2023. In order to illustrate the process of CBR, the 431 
current research time is assumed to be 2012. Hence, the residual concession period is from 2013 to 432 
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2023. According to toll shares by vehicle category listed in Table 3, the toll revenue of goods vehicles 433 
has been relatively stable, accounting for approximately 14% of all vehicle toll revenue of the WHC. 434 
Therefore, the average daily toll of WHC during the remaining operation years (𝜂) can be calculated 435 
as: 436 
𝜂 = 𝐴1̅̅ ̅ ÷ 14%                              (23) 437 
where 𝐴1̅̅ ̅ is the average daily toll of goods vehicles. 438 
Table 3. Toll shares for WHC by vehicle category 439 
Vehicle category 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Private cars 65% 64% 63% 75% 62% 61% 59% 58% 
Goods vehicles 15% 14% 14% 11% 14% 14% 14% 14% 
Bus 20% 22% 23% 14% 24% 25% 27% 28% 
Source: WHC company annual report (2012) 440 
 441 
Additionally, according to the annual reports of WHC, the proportion of the average daily toll of 442 
the three types (light, medium, and heavy) of goods vehicles in the last five years is around 7:2:1. 443 
Therefore 𝜂 can be further calculated based on medium goods vehicles as: 444 
𝜂 = 𝐴1̅̅ ̅ ÷ 14% = (𝐴1 ÷ 20%) ÷ 14% = 35 ⋅ 𝐴1                       (24) 445 
where 𝐴1 is the average daily toll of medium goods vehicles. Since the WHC project is approaching 446 
the transfer stage, it is imperative that a rational concession price is adjusted to ensure RV in the 447 
subsequent management. 448 
Hybrid dynamic pricing of WHC 449 
CBA-based residual concession price of WHC 450 
Reflecting on the WHC case, Eq. (7) can be rewritten as:  451 
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(1 − 𝑇2) ∑ [𝑃𝑡
𝑇−1
𝑡=1 𝑄𝑡(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐹1) + 𝑌 − 𝐶𝑡 − A]
1
(1+𝐾𝐸)𝑡










𝑡=T = −(1 − 𝑇2) ∑ [
𝑇𝑛




                                                              (25) 454 
With existing documents on WHC, some data are initially identified: 455 
• As all repayments of WHC have been made in 2012, the interest rate (R) is 2.02% 456 
according to WHC company annual report (2012).  457 
• According to the World Bank (2017), annual inflation rate from 1997 to 2012 (INF1) was 458 
calculated to be 5.18%. According to Table 7, annual inflation rate from 2013 to 2023 459 
(INF2) is 3.68%. 460 
• Income tax rate (𝑇2) is 16.5% and 𝐶0 is 7 billion HK dollars as stated in Western 461 
Harbour Tunnel Company Limited Annual Report 2012 (Company, 2018). 462 
• Internal rate of return (IRR) of the company up to Dec. 2012 generated was 13.4% 463 
(Company, 2018).  464 
Therefore, Eq. (25) equates to: 465 
 0.835∑ [𝑃𝑡
16
𝑡=1 𝑄𝑡(1 + 5.18%) + 𝑌 − 𝐶𝑡 − A]
1
(1+6.7%)𝑡















                   (26) 467 
CBR-based pricing model of WHC 468 
Creation of case database 469 
Description of the case problem and solution determines not only how the case will be stored in the 470 
database but also how a similar case can be retrieved for resolving the new case. With this in mind, 471 
hierarchic organization techniques, which enables rapid access to attributes (Chan et al. 2015), are 472 
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applied to present cases as PPP projects possess a complex structure comprising different categories 473 
(Watson 1999; Ma et al. 2005; Yuan et al. 2018). Therefore, from the perspective of the residual 474 
concession price of transport PPPs, the hierarchic case description structure is composed of project 475 
basic information, financial information, demand information, price information, risk factors of price, 476 
and overall evaluation of projects. As shown in Table 4, 31 attributes have been chosen to represent 477 
the PPP project cases and facilitate the retrieval process. A total of 41 projects of tunnel, bridge and 478 
highway are collected to create the case database and detailed project background information is listed 479 
in Appendix 1.480 
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Weight Description Data type 






2.06% Year Float 
Starting operation time 
Starting 
operation time 
2.06% Year Float 
Countries and regions 





5=National legislation on PPP projects; 4=Provincial and ministerial legislation or regulations 
on PPP projects; 3= Only local and municipal regulations; 2=Only County regulations; 1=No 











3.02% Year Float 
Operation 
period 
3.55% Year Float 
The past operation year 
The past 
operation year 
3.55% Year Float 
PPP type PPP type 4.29% BOT、BOOT、DBO、DBFO、TOT、Joint Venture etc. String 
Size 
Length 2.49% km Float 
Number of 
lanes 
2.17% Number of two-way Lanes Float 







3.55% Converted to the US dollar in 2010 Float 
Loan amount 2.70% Converted to the US dollar in 2010 Float 
Lending rates 2.70% The average value of each interest rate Float 
Repay deadline 2.81% Year Float 
Annual 
operation cost 
























3.55% Annual average variation in the past operation year Float 
Annual average 
variation of 





Initial price 3.65% Converted to the US dollar in 2010 Float 
Average 
adjustment 
period of price 









4.82% 0= Price cannot rise because of government decisions，1=Other situation String 




4.18% 0= Price cannot rise because of laws and regulations changes，1=Other situation String 
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Case retrieval  482 
Case retrieval (i.e. Pricing-CBR system) is undertaken by using MyCBR (version 2.6.6) and Protégé 483 
(version 3.4.8), a knowledge acquisition software. In addition, to accommodate each case’s various 484 
attributes, the matching process is divided into three steps to generate the best result.  485 
At Step 1, the User Interface (UI) is designed in the ‘Forms’ tab of Protégé. As shown in Figure 2, 486 
a new project named ‘PPP Project Cases’ is built, with the type and the allowed value assigned to each 487 
attribute in the ‘Main View’. 488 
 489 
Figure 2. Class and slot setting of PPP project case database 490 
 491 
At Step 2, the similar cases whose local similarity is the same as the input problem, and whose 492 
global similarity meets the threshold are retrieved. The threshold value is achieved through the 493 
adaptive threshold processing, which comprises: (1) setting an initial threshold value (?̅?) based on 494 
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experience; (2) constructing two sets of pixels G1 and G2 (G1 > ?̅?, G2 ≤?̅?); (3) calculating the 495 
average gray value of G1 and G2, namely m1 and m2; (4) calculating a new threshold value ?̅?′(?̅?′ =496 
(𝑚1+𝑚2)
2
); and (5) repeating (1)-(4) until the difference between ?̅?values in successive iterations is 497 
less than the predefined parameters ∆?̅?. Moreover, the weight of each attribute (the third column in 498 
Table 4) in the case database is obtained through a questionnaire survey (Appendix 2). 13 experienced 499 
experts with 11 experts from academia and two from industry in the field PPPs were surveyed on the 500 
importance of indicators on the similarity between two cases field. 501 
    At Step 3, the three most similar cases retrieved are EHT, Tate’s Cairn Tunnel, and East Yan’an 502 
Road Tunnel with the similarity scores being 0.91, 0.87, 0.87, respectively. The most similar case 503 
(EHT) is first used as the data input of the theoretical pricing model to set an initial price. Since its 504 
similarity score is below 1, all three cases are then selected to calculate the price adjustment 505 
mechanism (Eq. (28)). Similar to Liang et al. (2021), the weighted price adjustment range therefore 506 
shows the reasonable adjustment process. 507 
Price adjustment mechanism and CBR pricing results 508 
For the adjustment mechanism, as the rise of concession price has not been prevented by government 509 
behavior and public attitudes since the operation of WHC, the value of adjustment coefficient of 510 
government behavior and public attitude all equals to 1 according to Eqs. (9)-(11). 511 
𝑓1 (𝑥) = 1, 𝑓2 (𝑥) = 1, 𝑓3 (𝑥) = 1                      (27) 512 
Besides, using Eqs. (12)-(16), the adjustment coefficients of market risks and project risks are 513 
calculated in Table 5. As shown in Table 5, the average price adjustment range of EHT, Tate’s Cairn 514 
Tunnel, and East Yan’an Road Tunnel is 6.19%, 3.89%, 31.66%, respectively. Therefore, the actual 515 
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price adjustment range (Ri) is calculated using Eq. (17) as:  516 







   517 
       =
0.91×0.0619+0.87×0.0389+0.87×0.3166
0.91+0.87+0.87
=0.138                       (28) 518 











Annual average variation of 𝐶𝑡 -2.14% 3.94% 1.50% 1.05% 
Annual average variation of 𝑌𝑡 -0.05% -0.04% -0.11% -0.07% 
Annual average variation of 𝐼𝑁𝐹2 0.60% 0.40% 1.50% 0.83% 
Annual average variation of 𝑄𝑡 2.54% -0.37% 13.94% 5.33% 
z 3 8 5 5  
r 6.19% 3.89% 31.66% 13.80% 
Global similarity 91.00% 87.00% 87.00% - 
 520 
In addition, as the average adjustment period of price of WHC is five years (z in Table 5), the 521 







 =2                        (29) 523 
That is to say, there are two concession prices during WHC’s residual concession period, namely, 524 
𝑃2013−2017 and 𝑃2018−2023. 525 
As mentioned above, the most similar past case is EHT (i.e. the similarity score is 0.91). 526 
Therefore, it is used to provide data input for the model. The rate of return of EHT in concession year 527 
2004 (T=2004) and concession year 2012 (T=2012) is 9.5% and 13.4%, respectively. By contrast, the 528 
rate of return of WHC in concession year 2012 (T=2012) is only 1.05%. Thus, the upper limit of the 529 
rate of return of WHC is set as the half of the rate of return of EHT in 2012 (𝐾𝐸 = 6.7%). Furthermore, 530 
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based on the current research time (2012), other predictive value of pricing parameters of WHC for the 531 
residual concession period (from 2013 to 2023) is shown in Table 6, Table 7 and Appendix 3, 532 
respectively.  533 
Table 6. The source of data 534 
Parameter Value Source 
𝐶𝑡 














𝑃𝑡 Appendix 2 
𝐼𝑁𝐹1 5.18% 




D Appendix 2 
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Table 7. The predictive value of pricing parameters from 2013 to 2023 535 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Operation cost (𝐶𝑡) 
(1000 HK dollars) 
419683 424095 428552 433057 437609 442208 446856 451553 456299 461096 465942 
Other revenue (𝑌) 
(1000 HK dollars) 
40641 41502 42382 43281 44199 45136 46093 47070 48068 49087 50128 
Annual inflation rate (𝐼𝑁𝐹2) 3.53% 3.56% 3.59% 3.62% 3.65% 3.68% 3.71% 3.74% 3.77% 3.80% 3.83% 
Daily traffic volume for 
Medium good vehicles ( 𝑄𝑡) 
1429 1505 1586 1670 1759 1853 1951 2055 2165 2280 2401 
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Hybrid dynamic residual concession price of WHC 536 
     Using the price adjustment range in Eq. (28) and the data extracted from EHT, each term in Eq. 537 
(26) is analyzed to propose the hybrid dynamic residual concession price of WHC (i.e. 𝑃2013−2017 538 
and 𝑃2018−2023): 539 
Part I: 0.835∑ [𝑃𝑡
16
𝑡=1 𝑄𝑡(1 + 5.18%) + 𝑌 − 𝐶𝑡 − A]
1
(1+6.7%)𝑡
 refers to the present value of after tax 540 
profit from 1997 to 2012. 541 




𝑡=1  refers to the present value of interest after tax from 1997 to 542 
2012. 543 




𝑡=17  refers to the present value of after tax revenue from 2013 to 544 
2023. 545 





 refers to the present value of after tax traffic volume from 2013 to 546 
2023.  547 
    According to Eq. (8) and the data acquired above, the first residual concession price is calculated 548 
as: 549 
P2013−2017 = |
the present value of net profits over the years from 1997 to 2023
the present value of traffic flow from 2013 to 2017
| = |(𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭 I + 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭 II +550 
𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭 III)/𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭 IV| = 86 HK dollars                                              (30) 551 
Using the hybrid dynamic pricing model proposed in Eq. (22), the second residual concession 552 
price is calculated as: 553 




Discussion  556 
As is revealed by WHC annual report of 2019, the actual concession prices of WHC in 2013 and 2018 557 
are 90 HK dollars and 100 HK dollars, respectively. Both are higher than the predicted price (i.e. 86 558 
HK dollars and 98 HK dollars) and attain a respective error rate of 4.44% and 2%. The lower than 5% 559 
error rate suggests that the predicted concession price of the project is reasonable (Barlas 1994) and 560 
hence verifies the feasibility and applicability of the proposed model. Notably, the error rate is further 561 
reduced (from 4.44% to 2%) when the price adjustment mechanism is employed, indicating that the 562 
consideration of dynamic risk factors can reflect the project’s changing trend and thus safeguard the 563 
RV after transfer. Existing literature also indicates that the closer the actual price and the predicted 564 
value is, the more robust and accurate the proposed model is (Yuan et al. 2018). Although the actual 565 
prices are higher than the predicted prices, the result is consistent with previous studies on PPPs 566 
concession price. A study conducted by Xu et al. (2012) also shows that the predicted value is lower 567 
than the actual scenario. Such space not only reserves flexibility in the event of further uncertainties 568 
but also provides governments with a reference in terms of how much they can adjust the concession 569 
price after transfer. For example, if there is a market fluctuation or public attitudes’ change during 570 
governments’ subsequent management because the concession price is high/ low, governments can 571 
reduce/ increase the price within a certain range without sacrificing RV. In addition, as private sectors 572 
are profit-driven they tend to set a price (e.g. the actual price) that is higher than the normal price (e.g. 573 
the predicted price) to withstand the risks (Chen et al. 2018; Feng et al. 2018). This goes someway to 574 
explaining the discrepancy (i.e. error rate 4.44% and 2%) between the actual price and the predicted 575 
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value.  576 
     It should also be noted that many PPPs’ concession price when transfer is either too high or too 577 
low, leading to the suffer of RV. Different from existing models, this proposed model targets 578 
particularly at those PPPs that are in operation and/ or are entering transfer stage. As can be seen, this 579 
hybrid dynamic model underpinned by scientific rules is capable of intervening at a certain time (Eq. 580 
(14)), calculating the price adjustment range (Eq. (17)), and predicting a reasonable residual 581 
concession price (Eq. (22)). Equally important, it addresses the changing attribute of pricing 582 
parameters, enabling the dynamic adjustment of this model. In the case of WHC, it assumes that the 583 
current research time is 2012. As such, the residual concession prices are 𝑃2013`2017 and 𝑃2018`2023 . 584 
It then calculates the price adjustment range to be 13.8% and predicts the residual concession price to 585 
be 86 HK dollars and 98 HK dollars, respectively.  586 
The primary motivation for establishing this model is to achieve the satisfaction trade-off among 587 
stakeholders through adjusting the residual concession price. Firstly, theoretical pricing model is 588 
calibrated by setting pricing parameters to reasonable values and considering factors of the conditions 589 
that create the problem. In practice, the theoretical pricing model based on CBA can be seamlessly 590 
used by practitioners (e.g. the private sector) as the CBA method has been widely applied in PPPs to 591 
make the investment decision (Penyalver et al., 2019). Thus, practitioners can familiarize themselves 592 
with the initial model by inputting concession price-related parameters identified above and/ or 593 
inputting parameters that are specific to their projects. Then, data from past similar project were 594 
extracted by CBR to predict the price of the target case WHC during the residual concession period. It 595 
is estimated that the advanced CBR-based hybrid model may create difficulties for practitioners and 596 
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thus hamper its implementation. Nevertheless, with the facilitation of MyCBR and Protégé, the 597 
sophisticated prediction process is simplified and becomes semi-automated. In order to address 598 
practitioners’ popular refrainment from the ‘newborn’ (see, for example, Burger and Hawkesworth, 599 
2011 and Chan et al., 2019), regular training programs and follow-up workshops can be enacted to 600 
enable practitioners’ access to professional knowledge and advices and nourish the culture of learning 601 
from the ‘good’. Although the process can be painful, such initiatives have been proven to be 602 
worthwhile over the long term. Examples can be seen in Gann et al. (2003) and Liu et al. (2018) 603 
where bespoken workshops and learning mechanisms widened the adoption of design quality 604 
indicators and a life-cycle PPP performance measurement model in the United Kingdom and Australia, 605 
respectively. Finally, based on the output of the model, public sectors and private sectors can set and 606 
adjust transport PPPs’ residual concession price to make informed decisions to satisfy project 607 
participants. 608 
For the public sector, utilizing the model output can assist them in initiating governments’ 609 
pricing policy based on predicted pricing parameters. For instance, policy should aim to minimize the 610 
influence of changing risk factors (e.g. public attitudes, market risks and project risks) if the gap 611 
between the actual price and theoretical price is large. For the private sector, the model output can be 612 
employed to set a concession price that covers the cost of risks they assume in the project. In the 613 
meantime, as public attitudes are considered in the price adjustment mechanism, the general public’s 614 
demand (i.e. an affordable price) can be met, which in turn engenders a stable project revenue. A 615 




PPPs have been adopted worldwide to deliver infrastructure projects and/ or provide public services. 618 
As a number of PPPs are entering into the transfer stage, a reasonable concession price during the 619 
residual concession period is pivotal for both governments and private sectors. However, due to the 620 
changing attribute of pricing parameters, the concession price of transport PPPs is not satisfactory 621 
when transferred to the host government. The result is that RV continues to suffer in the post-transfer 622 
period. Nevertheless, there is a paucity of rational and systematic concession pricing models of 623 
transport PPPs during the residual concession period in the existing literature. To this end, a hybrid 624 
dynamic pricing model for transport PPPs has been developed in this study. Specifically, the 625 
conventional CBA is adjusted to propose the theoretical pricing model to illustrate the relationships 626 
between concession pricing parameters. In order to address the changing price-related risk parameters 627 
(i.e. government behavior, public attitude, market risk and project risk), a price adjustment mechanism 628 
is then developed using CBR. In addition, by virtue of an historical case database, CBR provides the 629 
dynamic hybrid model with required data input for the theoretical pricing model and the price 630 
adjustment mechanism. The feasibility of the dynamic hybrid pricing model is validated via the WHC 631 
PPP project. Through the employment of CBR, the price-related risk parameters are simulated and the 632 
price adjustment range is calculated as 13.8%. Using data acquired from the most similar past case (EHT, 633 
similarity score 0.91), the residual concession price is predicted to be 86 HK dollars and 98 HK dollars, 634 
respectively.  635 
The contributions of this study are twofold: (1) it highlights that a reasonable concession price 636 
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beyond the operation period is significant in maintaining RV. This is because a reasonable residual 637 
concession price can be set through the hybrid dynamic model, which will guarantee the project 638 
profitability after the transfer stage and further secure its RV; and (2) it provides a dynamic hybrid 639 
pricing model for governments and private sectors to calibrate the current less-than-satisfactory residual 640 
concession price. This is because it is tested to be able to adjust, correct and track the residual 641 
concession price of transport PPPs, especially highways. Future research can be conducted to expand 642 
this model to a wider sector and empirically examine the impact of a reasonable residual concession 643 
price on the accumulation of RV.  644 
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Notation 655 




𝐵𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡= net profit in year t 658 
𝑃𝑡 = the concession price in year t 659 
𝑄𝑡= the traffic volume in year t 660 
 𝑌𝑡= the other revenue in year t 661 
T1= the sales tax rate 662 
𝐶𝑡= the operation cost in year t 663 
 𝑒𝑡= the exchange rate in year t 664 
e = the exchange rate in every year 665 
 𝑅𝑡= the interest in year t 666 
R = the interest in every year 667 
𝐷𝑡= the loan in year t 668 
𝐶𝑑= the depreciation 669 
T2 = the income tax rate 670 
A = the annual principal repayment 671 
P = the initial price 672 
INF= the annual rate of inflation 673 
 𝐼𝑁𝐹1 = the average inflation rate in the past operation period 674 
𝐼𝑁𝐹2 = the average inflation rate in the residual concession period 675 
𝑇𝑐 = the concession period (i.e. unit: year) 676 
 𝑇0 = the construction period (i.e. unit: year)  677 
𝐶0 = the total investment 678 
𝑇F = the payment deadline agreed in the contract 679 
T = the operation period at current research time 680 
𝐾𝐸= discount rate 681 
m =the number of similar cases 682 
𝑄𝑘
′ = the traffic volume adjustment range of the target case ?̅?  683 
𝑄𝑖,𝑘 = the traffic volume adjustment range of the selected case 𝑋𝑖  in the year of k;  684 
?̅?𝑖,𝑘 =the traffic volume of the selected case 𝑋𝑖  in the year of k 685 
?̅?𝑖,𝑘−1 is the traffic volume of the selected case 𝑋𝑖  in the year of k-1 686 
𝑟𝑖,𝑘=the price adjustment range of the selected case 𝑋𝑖  in the year of k 687 
r̅𝑖,𝑘 and ?̅?𝑖,𝑘−1 = the price of the selected case 𝑋𝑖  in the year of k and k-1 688 
𝑅𝑖 = the actual price adjustment range in the period i 689 
Sim(Y,̅ X𝑖) = the similarity between the selected case 𝑋𝑖  and the target case ?̅? 690 
𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖(𝑎𝑖
?̅? , 𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖) = the similarity between attributes 𝑎𝑖
?̅? and 𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖  691 
𝑎𝑖
?̅?  =the index of the new case 692 
𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖=the index of the existing case in memory 693 
 𝑑(𝑎𝑖
?̅? , 𝑎𝑖
𝑋𝑖) =the absolute distance between 𝑎𝑖
?̅? and 𝑎𝑖





𝑋𝑖)) = the distance-based similarity function 695 
𝑤𝑖 = the weight of attribute i 696 
n = the number of attributes 697 
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𝑥𝑖𝑗  is the score of indicator i in the No. j questionnaire 698 
M is the total score of all indicators 699 
Pi = the price in the residual concession period i 700 
Pi-1 = the price in period i-1 701 
?̅? =the periodicity of concession price 702 
𝜂=the average daily toll of WHC during the remaining operation years 703 
𝐴1̅̅ ̅ = the average daily toll of goods vehicles 704 
𝐴1 is the average daily toll of medium goods vehicles 705 
?̅? =setting an initial threshold value  706 
G1 and G2= two sets of pixels 707 
m1 and m2= the average gray value of G1 and G2 708 




∆?̅?=the predefined parameters  710 
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